




RENEWING STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION 
IN ASIA PACIFIC
Introduction
The year 2005 began with a series of attempts for a strategie new modelling in East 
Asia. The US President George Bush has been well into his second term and star- 
ted to shape up a new regional strategie environment. In the light of the incessant 
Iraqi as well as the North Korean issue, at this moment the US obviously need to 
make a more diplomatic effort rather than rely purely on the military superiority in 
intemational affairs. This was clearly highlighted by the new Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice, at her eonfirmation hearing at the Senate on 18 January, 2005. 
She indicated: “we must use American diplomacy to help create a balance of power 
in the world that favors freedom. And the time for diplomacy is now”1.
Even if the US have sińce July 2005 realized that the campaign in Iraq 
may drag on further and may last even longer than many have expected, the US 
began to refocus their strategy on coping with the rise of China. While the US has 
been preoccupied with Iraq, it has discovered the way China has ąuickly filled out 
the strategie vacuum all over the places around China’s neighbouring countries. 
Leaving aside the Iraąi scenario, the US are now facing two daunting strategie 
challenges in their national security strategy: the war against terrorism and the ri- 
sing and powerful China.
1 “Opening Remarks by Secretary of State-Designate Dr. Condoleezza Rice”, Secretary Condoleezza Rice
at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., January 18, 2005, http://www.state.gov/secretary/
rm/2005/40991 .htm.
Based upon a new idea of diplomacy, the new trend comes with a recon- 
ciliatory approach to the Atlantic relations, the regeneration of the US-Japan secu­
rity alliance, the appeal to India for a strategie partnership, and the building of 
a constructive partnership with China. At the tactic (sub-regional) level, the two 
major security challenges in East Asia lying ahead of the regional agenda are the 
North Korean nuclear issue and the Taiwan Strait with which the new strategie 
layout is mainly to cope. Among all else, China’s continuous military build-up and 
the obsession with military power remain the greatest t waming sign to the US and 
Japan as well as the regional countries. With an inereasing security concem, the US 
and Japan have plunged into the action of strengthening the naturę o f mutual secu­
rity alliance. Following the so-called US-Japan “two plus two” ministerial meeting 
in Washington, D.C. in February 20052, in September the US and Japan met again 
trying to consolidate their differences and find a way to materialize the security 
linkage3.
The focus of the US strategy is critical to East Asia security. Neverthe- 
less, at the strategie level, the recent strategie evolution implies that apart from 
counter-terrorism, the rise of China has become an important factor of a strategie 
transformation in Asia, which may dominate the direction of a long term regional 
strategie development for decades ahead. Accordingly, China’s recent all-out di- 
plomatic advancement and achievement have been seen as an attempt to elbow off 
the leading roles of the US and Japan in the regional security and economic affairs. 
US analysts have expressed concem about the development of this growing trend, 
as the Chinese-driven development of Asian regionalism is potentially shifting 
toward a new Asian-centric architecture4. It makes many in the region ponder if the 
current trend would prevail without the US’ involvement and this new Asian- 
centric regional mechanism would shape a true naturę of Asian regionalism.
What are the real intents of the strategie competition between the US and 
China? What exactly does the US strategy aim at? Are the US developing a new 
round of containment over China? Needless to say, the move o f the US strategy in 
the region has certainly propelled a similar momentum from the region for balan- 
cing the American strategie effort at least from a diplomatic front. Recently, China, 
India and Japan have been on the move catching up the least strategie transforma­
tion and tried very hard to add strategie weight over the new picture. The East 
Asian region has come to a stage of a dynamie strategie transformation.
On account of the strategie calculation, there is a elear rivalry between 
strategie intents of the US and China. The rise of Chinese nationalism against Ja­
pan indicates that different strategie interests and security deliberation may have 
hastened their historical animosity. As of now, Japan clearly takes the side of the 
US, while the Chinese have successfully wooed many regional countries with eco-
2 “Remarks With Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Japan’s Foreign Minister Machimura and Defense 
Minister Ohno”, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Loy Henderson Auditorium, Washington, D.C., February 19, 2005.
3 “U.S.-Japan Strategie Development Alliance”, Joint Statement, Office o f  the Spokesman, Washington, 
DC. September 17,2005.
4 B. V au gh n , “China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications for the United States”, 
CRS Report for Congress, 8 February 2005.
nomie incentives and peaceful image. However, worrying about the potential threat 
of China’s growing military strength, Japan has blatantly pinpointed China and the 
North Korea as her current key security concem. Under this pressure, Japan and the 
US have committed to reinforce their mutual security alliance and together laid 
down common strategie objectives. Japan is also facing a transformation of her 
intemational role and demands for a normal State from within the society.
Recently, Chinese top leaders have conducted high profile foreign visits 
to four countries in South Asia (in April by Premier Weng Jiabao) and to three 
states in Southeast Asia (in late April by President Hu Jintao) seeking for formula- 
ting a strategie partnership network around China’s neighbouring countries. China 
shows her determination to stabilize her extemal environment and a strategie in- 
tention to build a sphere of influence. Are we envisioning an era of forming a co- 
operative and contending security matrix in Asia? Would a concurrent course of 
these strategie shifts lead to a US-China competition and a futurę potential conflict 
between China and the US-Japan?
On the Macro-Level of Strategie Development 
The US-China Complex Relations: from a “Competitor” to a “Stakeholder”?
The pivotal bilateral relation in the region is the one between the US and China. 
Since the US President George Bush began his first tenure, China had been descri- 
bed by the US policy makers as a strategie competitor. When the terrorist attack 
occurred on 11 September, 2001, the US national security strategy was suddenly 
plunged into a temporary chaos and forced to adjust to a new direction of fighting 
against non-traditional enemies. The terrorist strike on the twin towers in New 
York and the Pentagon awoke many policy thinkers inside the Beltway and thus 
the focus of its national security strategy was shifted towards a pre-emptive orien- 
tation. The priority of the policy was then readjusted. The counter-terrorist campa- 
ign became the top priority.
Under such a strategie structure, the US moved to another era of diplo- 
matic cosy relationships with some countries which support counter-terrorism. 
While the US have been concentrated on fighting terrorism and the lraq issues, the 
US especially need China to help out with the North Korea issues. On the six-party 
talk and Taiwan Strait issues, the US need to work with China closely. Around 
2003-2004, the US began promoting a elear relationship with China. The US-China 
relationship was described as “candid, cooperative, and constructive”. Many for- 
mer officials, including Richard Armitage, the deputy Secretary of State, and James 
Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State reminded many that the US shared best rela­
tions with China ever. It was contentious as while the US, China, and Taiwan once 
all claimed the best stage o f their bilateral relations with each other, the crisis in the 
Strait arose.
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In 2005 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice suggested that the US-China 
relations were entering into a complex situation, which implies both a cooperative 
and a conflict scenario. On 21 September Robert Zoellick, the deputy Secretary of 
State, said that “We now need to encourage China to become a responsible ‘stake- 
holder’ in the intemational system”5. The US are now facing a stronger and tougher 
China, which with certain military strength cannot be ignored in a traditional way. 
In October 2005, China successfully launched and landed a space shuttle and im- 
plied that its military technology was fast catching up with the level of the US and 
Russia.
The Peaceful Rise and Emergence of China’s Sphere of Influence
The rise of China has become an existing reality. Since China became a UN mem- 
ber in 1971, China has begun the catching-up process of leaming in the intematio­
nal commumty. In the past few decades, China made many mistakes but also lear- 
ned enormous lessons. The Chinese perspective of the world in the past followed 
the traditional line of scoming imperialist suppression, which was fraught with 
humiliation and a negative picture of colonial sentiment. Today, as China’s com- 
prehensive national power increases, the world has seen a powerful, richer, more 
confident and smarter China emerging on the horizon.
Entering the fourth generation of leadership, President Hu Jintao has to 
combine the powerful rise with a peace image in order to prevent the frightening of 
neighbouring countries. In order to ease away the intemational concems, the inter- 
nal discussion on the “peaceful rise” was concluded by suggestmg a new termino- 
logy of “peace and development”, as if the rise of China would bring about peace 
and help promote economic development. Thus, it couples with its good neighbo- 
urs diplomacy as a part of its “charm offensive” to advance into the neighbouring 
regions. For example, China advances in Southeast Asia with a peace image by 
getting involved in several critical areas: the acceleration of bilateral trade, the 
increase of its investment in the region, the growth of bilateral assistance, and the 
provision of regional assistance to the ASEAN region. While China has been wor- 
king very hard to re-invent its new relationships with Southeast Asian countries, it 
has also tried to reduce any possible territorial disputes with its neighbours. Even if 
sovereign issues have so far gone nowhere, the charming appeal of pending dispu­
tes and encouraging joint exploitation easily wins trust and friends.
In the most updated China’s national proposal for the 2006-2010 the na­
tional program for economic and social development issued by the Communist 
Party of China, China promises to “stick to its independent foreign policy of peace, 
keep to the road of peaceful development, strengthen relations with foreign coun­
tries, and promote intemational cooperation”6. The main purpose of the Eleventh
5 R. Zoellick, Whither China: from membership to responsibility?, Remarks to National Committee on 
US-China relations, New York, 21 September 2005,.http://www.state.gOv/s/d/rem/53682.litm.
6 CPC calls on whole country to work hard towards 2010, “Xinhua Online”, 19 October 2005,
Five-Year Program reflects that China cannot sustain the domestic social disparity 
and the growing internal dissatisfaction at her current economic course. She has to 
come to terms with her domestic problems before China can go any further. Thus, 
it needs a peaceful external environment that could allow China to expand without 
being disturbed.
Having realized the fundamental concern of China, Chinese have suc­
cessfully encroached into all sectors, including the economic, political, diplomatic, 
and military ones in her external relations. Now, China is not only a regional politi­
cal and military power, but also a leading economy in Asia. With her substantial 
market potential and manufacturing capacity, China is sucking most of foreign 
direct investment in the region and leading a new pattern of economic development 
in Asia. None of the countries in the region can spare any sort of relationship with 
China. Therefore, to assess the effect of the rise of China nowadays becomes most 
desirable and perhaps fashionable among the region’s countries.
With the rise of a powerful China, President Hu Jintao has proved to be 
more confident and perhaps assertive in managing foreign and security policy. 
Unlike his predecessor, Jian Zemin, he encourages the formation of a strategic 
partnership network with the important countries around. In a way, this deve­
lopment looks as if China is building an anti-American alliance. There are the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization to the west and north, the ASEAN plus China 
to the southeast front, and the strategic and cooperative partnership with India and 
the strategic partnership with Pakistan to the southern front. On the annual SCO 
summit in July 2005, the concluding joint statement formally requested that the US 
troops deployed in Central Asia should be withdrawn7. In less than two months 
(December 2005), a China-centred East Asian Summit will take place in K.L. The 
likely anti-American alliance will be further reinforced. There may be more effect 
developing from there. It deserves further observation.
The List of China’s Strategic Partners
China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (8 October 2003) 
China-Russia Strategic and Coordinative Partnership 
China-India Strategic and Cooperative Partnership (12 April 2005) 
China-Pakistan Strategic Partnership 
China-Kazakhstan Strategic Partnership (04 July 2005)
Friendly partnership
China-Uzbckistan Friendly and Cooperative Partnership 
China-Mongolia Good-Neighbourly Partnership with Mutual Trust
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-10/19/content_3644141.litm. Proposed by the Communist Party of China Cen­
tral Committee on the Eleventh Five-Year Program on National Economy and Social Development, the document was
adopted at the Fifth Session of the 16th CPC Central Committee which ended 11 October, 2005.
7 A. de Nesnera, Shanghai Cooperation Organization Flexes Political Muscle, “Voice of America”, 18 
July 2005, http://voanews.com/english/archive/2005-07/2005-07-18-voa58.cfm7CFIEN30121736 &CFTOKEN= 
12122199.
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On the Micro-Level of Strategie Development
On the micro-level, there are six recent developments to be emphasized:
1. The Refocus of the US-Japan common strategie objectives
Japan’s strategie shift was more of a response to China’s advancement toward the 
Pacific. Driven by the Chinese blunt intrusion, Japanese are frustrated and feel the 
mounting pressure on security. A number of recent incidents include the frequent 
excursion of Chinese scientific research vessels and military ships into Japan’s 
exclusive economic zone. However, the most astonishing move came as a Chinese 
nuclear submarine entered Japan’s territorial water and was found on 10 Novem- 
ber, 2004. It reminded of the fact that China had recently inereased her battling for 
marinę resources in the East China Sea, including the natural gas drilling. The inci- 
dent immediately sent a strong shocking wave through the public in Japan and 
China’s growing challenges to Japan loom larger.
On 10 December, 2004, the Japanese Govemment approved the 
“National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005” (the new NDPG) and the “Mid- 
Term Defense Program, FY 2005-FY 2009”, in which two particular countries 
were singled out as key security concems, North Korea and China. For the first 
time in Japan’s post-World War II history, Japan openly put China as one of the 
key security concems.
On the US-Japan “two plus two” Security Consultative committee in 
Washington in February 2005, the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan 
Strait and encouraging China to improve the transparency of her military affairs 
were made a common strategie objective. It is obvious that Japan’s concems with 
the Chinese continuing to modemize their nuclear forces and missile capabilities as 
well as their naval and air forces were reflected in the joint statement. As China is 
expanding her area o f operation at sea, the maritime security has touched the nerve 
of the US and Japan’s vital interest. The sea-lane o f communication right across the 
west Pacific is at the centre o f the strategie matrix on the US-Japan side.
2. Regenerating the Six-Party Talks and a Possible Security Framework
The Six-party Talks have stagnated sińce late last year, when North Korea unilate- 
rally announced her dissatisfaction with the US policy and would indefmitely walk 
away from the talks. Even if  the talks did not resume before September 2005, 
a multilateral shuttle diplomacy has taken place among all participants. The US 
repeatedly urge China to take more responsibility for resuming the talks. As long as 
the Six-Party Talks process is undergoing re-consultation, North Korea will be 
confined within the existing framework, notwithstanding the fact it does not wish 
to come forward. Although each country’s participation in the process is based on
a different account of a national interest, no one would deny the region’s need to be 
nuclear-free. With regard to the North Korean nuclear issue, the US and China can 
come up with a common interest of their diplomatic efforts.
The fourth Six-Party Talk restarted in September 2005. To many ana- 
lysts’ great surprise, the talk concluded with a first ever joint statement among all 
the participants. It started in a nonnal fashion. Since the talks had been continued 
for some time and the critical issues between the US and North Korea remained so 
obvious, nobody seemed to believe that the breakthrough o f the talk would come 
any time soon. However, for the sake o f forging a successful conclusion the US 
decided to alter their long argued position: they promised not to deploy nuclear 
weapons in the Peninsula and not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea. The 
US maintained their position in terms o f reąuesting North Korea to give up the 
nuclear program, but they would allow a peaceful use o f nuclear. For the first time, 
the US felt the pressure from the rest of the parties to sort it out sooner, though 
there remained differences between the US and North Korea. North Korea is still 
suspicious about the US and calculates that before the US light water nuclear re- 
actor can be built, the country would be reluctant to give up nuclear weapons as 
yet. What the US have viewed differently in the Talk this time was the uniformity 
of North and South Koreas. It implies that the US traditional alliance with South 
Korea may have come to a juncture where their policy focus has split and their 
interests do not overlap.
The progress conceming the security mechanism of the Six-Party Talks 
has stimulated further discussion on whether it would become a region-wide mul- 
tilateral security framework. Despite the stagnation o f the process, the spirit of 
regular security talks and dialogues does bring about optimism. If the next few 
rounds of the six-party talk can deliver something substantial to peace and stability, 
the framework will definitely grow.
3. The Impact o f China’s Military Build-up
What would be the immediate impact of China’s fast military build-up? Would 
China’s growing military capability change the regional strategie environment? 
Who would become the victims of China’s military build-up? Since China’s milita­
ry build-up does not make itself transparent to the outside world, China’s military 
intention is not predictable. Nor does her strategie layout convey sufficiently open 
and accountable information. Recently, China’s military modemization process has 
gone a fast pace through the increasing defence budget, arms procurement, joint 
development program with other countries, technology transfer, and upgrading 
military industry. The intention of a military modemization is said to deter the US 
military attack, to discourage American support to Taiwan, to coerce and threaten 
Taiwan to accept China’s political condition, and to strengthen the PLA navy’s 
power projection in the South China Sea. At present, China is heading for building 
a blue water navy and challenging head-on the dominance of Japan and the US in
the western Pacific. It will not only change the current strategie landscape of the 
region, but also jeopardize the intemational sea lane o f communication. China’s 
growing military clout in the region has intensified the competition against Japan 
and the US. The regional military analyses, including the annual US-China military 
assessment report, suggest that as a result of China’s modemization, the military 
balance in the Taiwan Strait is tilting toward China. It further heightens the risk of 
a conflict in the Strait.
It inereases the rationale that the EU should not lift arms embargo to Chi­
na, as any compromise to that end will only intensify the regional instability and 
after all send a misleading signal to China and the region. We often forget to ask 
how the EU’s arm sales to China will affect the regional military balance? The 
Asia Pacific is at the brink of a strategie structure shifting and does not need any 
extra factor to accelerate the change.
4. India and East Asia Security
Along with the US-China strategie competition, India’s growing national power 
and its geo-political significance have made the country indispensable to power 
competition. China has tried to improve her bilateral relations with India by ope- 
ning up border negotiation and broadening economic contacts. Since early 2005 the 
US and China have respectively made a cooperative progress with India. The US 
and India even signed a security framework agreement in which the US promises 
to help India with nuclear technology. This move has highlighted the US strategie 
focus of strengthening a geo-political cooperation with India in South Asia.
It shows that India’s significance in East Asia security is growing. In ad- 
dition, India is preparing to further involvement in the regional activities. Her Look 
East policy has developed further beyond the Southeast Asia region and led to bi­
lateral relationships with Taiwan, China, Japan and South Korea. India is expan- 
ding her military role and lately has conducted joint military exercises with China, 
the US, and Russia. India’s military projection inereases her responsibility in pro- 
tecting the sea lane o f communication right from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca 
Strait in the Indian Ocean. India will have more to contribute to maritime security, 
which is in accordance with the US global interest.
5. The Impact of the Anti-Secession Law on Security in the Taiwan Strait
Chinese People’s Congress promulgated the “Anti-Secession Law” on 14 March 
2005. It contains “non-peaceful measures” to deal with the Taiwan issues. It obvio- 
usly sends a direct threatening message to Taiwan, even though the law also propo- 
ses a flexible room for the cross-strait relations. Immediately, the US, Japan, and 
the EU issued a strong statement saying that the law was unproductive and un-
helpful to the peaee. It is absolutely unpopular in Taiwan. Most Taiwanese see it as 
threatening.
Issuing the Law was a part of Beijing’s strategy against Taiwan. The Law 
has clearly set the tone and framework in which Beijing’s leaders need from now 
on to follow through the tougher policy guideline. Namely, Beijing’s “soft softer, 
and hard harder” strategy can be freely played out, after the hardest line is set. Lo- 
gically, Beijing will thereafter try to open out more flexibility to woo Taiwan. Ri- 
ght after the Law was issued, the Chinese leaders warmly received the opposition 
leaders’ visit to China. Indeed, there is a Taiwan fever in Mainland China. It did 
dramatically soothe the criticism on the Law. But, the critical challenge now is that 
Beijing’s policy is complicated by Taiwan’s domestic inter-party struggle. The 
opposition, the Pan-blue camp, and the ruling coalition, the pan-green camp, do not 
for the time being meet any consensus on any issue. The Law may echo what the 
hardliners in China desire for. However, it also maintains the possibility of a po- 
tential crisis in the Strait. While Taiwan cannot yet reach a consensus on what to do 
with China, this uncertainty may send a wrong signal to China.
6. Problematic Japan-China Relations
When the Chinese burst up to bum Japanese cars right after losing a football game 
to the Japanese team in Beijing in spring 2005, anti-Japan riots erupted in a number 
of cities in China. The rise o f Chinese nationalism becomes an issue in the regional 
security. In 2004, Japan’s govemment made a decisive move to name China as one 
of Japan’s security concems. In February 2005, the US-Japan security meeting 
brought forward a strategie cooperation targeting China. On the diplomatic level, 
the natural-gas-field rights in the East China Sea continues to cause rage between 
them. The military and economic competition between China and Japan has been 
intensified lately. Looking beyond the military competition, China moves into the 
economic arena and challenges Japan’s leadership in the region. East Asia Summit 
would show how to claim the top seat in the region. Lately, the Chinese successful 
five-day spacecraft joumey circling the Earth lights up a new space race in Asia, 
especially between China and Japan8. The space ambition implies more than eco­
nomic capacity. It represents superiority o f the technological advancement, inclu- 
ding the scientific research level and military technology.
Japan-China relations have reached an unstable era. Japan’s Prime Mini­
ster Koizumi won a landslide victory during the latest generał election. Koizumi’s 
victory may have given him a much larger legitimate power no one has had in Ja­
pan’s recent history in politics. His political legend is going to last much longer 
and the political reform will go through with him. A conservative and independent 
line of foreign policy may be more likely. His insistence on the regular visits to 
Yakusuni Shrine touches the most sensitive nerve of Japan-China relations. Japan
8J. F r e d e r ic k ,  Asia 's space race, “Time”, 17 October 2005, p. 20-24.
and China’s competition will permeate all the aspects o f the bilateral relationships. 
Confident leaders of both countries may feel it easier to manage the situation than 
being out o f control, but they are more likely to stem firm on their position from 
which their constituencies gain support. This uncertain relation between Japan and 
China will determine the major development of Asia’s strategie transformation.
Concluding Remarks
Asia has come to a new era where the US-China strategie competition is speeding 
up. The impacts on the macro-level o f the regional security are: firstly, the China- 
driven new shift of Asian regional architecture is taking place, the China-Japan’s 
regional competition is heightened, the US-China geo-political strategie advance- 
ment is getting more obvious.
The currently developing trend of a strategie transformation in Asia could 
gradually shape up a new cooperative structure for the futurę. The main ąuestions 
are: whether Asia could sustain its regional cooperation or even integration without 
the US involvement? To what extent could the US tolerate this Asia-centric archi­
tecture to dominate the futurę strategie landscape?
The US is currently undergoing their Chinese policy readjustment. Under 
the new strategie thinking framework, China will be the major target of the US 
Asian strategy. It may deserve a closer look whether it will lead to the US-China 
reconciliation or competition. The scope of the regional security will be fraught 
with the traditional layout o f strategie competition and cooperation on the format of 
two camps, and the untraditional security challenges to the region.
